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1. Introduction 
 
Intuitions about past‐tensed narratives were instrumental in the development of a 
theory of tense and aspect in the 1980s, giving rise to Discourse Representation Theory 
(DRT; Kamp 1981). The key observation was that eventive sentences in past‐tensed 
narratives ‘move the story forward’, whereas stative sentences do not. Consider the 
two discourses below, modified from Kamp, Genabith and Reyle 2011: 
 
(1)  a. Josef turned around.  
       b. The man pulled his gun from his holster. 
       c. Josef took a step back. 
 
(2)  a. Josef turned around.  
       b. The man had a gun in his holster. 
       c. Josef took a step back. 
 
The only difference between (1) and (2) is the b‐sentence. Whereas the former 
discourse contains the eventive VP pulled a gun, the latter discourse contains the stative 
VP had  a  gun. This impacts how we understand the ordering of the described 
eventualities. The discourse in (1) exemplifies narrative  progression: the events are 
understood to occur in the order in which they are described. The discourse in (2), 
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however, is more complicated. Although we infer narrative progression in (2a) and 
(2c), the state described in (2b) is understood to hold at the time that Josef turned 
around. 
Such intuitions led to a theory of temporal anaphora that builds on Partee’s 
(1973) idea of treating the past tense like a pronoun. In particular, the past tense seeks a 
salient time antecedent, called a reference  time, prior to the speech time. This is 
analogous to she  seeking a salient individual antecedent that is female. In turn, the 
reference time is related to the time of the eventuality (event or state) by other 
mechanisms (e.g. the aspect). In other words, the reference time mediates between the 
speech time and the event time. This idea, first proposed by Reichenbach (1947), has 
often been referred to as the “two‐dimensional” analysis of tense (Kamp 1999/2013). 
Relating this analysis to the discourses above, the crux is that sentences with 
eventive VPs (or “eventive sentences”) provide a reference time of the right kind, that 
is, one that satisfies the presupposition of the past tense, whereas sentences with stative 
VPs do not provide a reference time (Partee 1984; Hinrichs 1986). For example, in (1c), 
the reference time is provided by the eventive sentence in (1b), namely some time in 
the past that is ‘just after’ the man pulled his gun from his holster.1 As a result, we 
understand the gun pulling to take place after the turning around. In (2c), however, the 
antecedent is some time in the past ‘just after’ Josef turned around because (2a) is the 
only other eventive sentence in the discourse and hence the only other sentence that 
could provide a reference time. As a result, we understand the taking a step back to 
take place after the turning around, but not necessarily after the man had a gun in his 
holster. 
Research in AI in the 1980s pioneered by Jerry Hobbs also analyzed narrative 
discourse, but from a different point of view. Instead of explaining our intuitions about 
event ordering in terms of semantic rules, Hobbs (1985, 1990) appealed to 
commonsense reasoning with non‐linguistic information. In particular, Hobbs 
extended David Hume’s principles of idea association to model how we interpret a 
given discourse; he assumed that there is a primitive class of rhetorical relations 
according to which a discourse is organized, i.e. a discourse is coherent because it is 
organized by particular rhetorical relations.2   
                                                 
1 The ‘time just after’ is purposely vague. It is “determined by the hearer’s understanding of the nature of 
events being described in a narrative, the overall degree of detail in which events are being described, and 
common knowledge about the usual temporal relationships among events...each successive sentence 
presents the very next event that transpires that is important enough to merit the speaker’s describing it to 
the hearer, given the purpose of the narration” (Dowty 1986:47). 
2 Hume famously wrote: “To me there appear to be only three principles of connection among ideas, 
namely Resemblance, Contiguity in time or place, and Cause or Effect” (Hume 1748/2008:16). 
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For example, the Humean notion of contiguity  is often characterized by the so‐
called “OCCASION relation” (Kehler 2006:250), which is defined below, in (3). It has 
played a vital role in a variety of research projects within the cognitive sciences3 
because it is seen as the backbone to any narrative (Hobbs 1990: Ch. 5).4 
 
(3) OCCASION(S0, S1):  
a. A change of state can be inferred from the assertion of S0, whose final state can be 
inferred from S1  
b. A change of state can be inferred from the assertion of S1, whose initial state can 
be inferred from S0 (Hobbs 1990:87). 
 
To see the impact of the definition above, let us relate it to the discourse in (1). In 
particular, let’s suppose that (1a) corresponds to discourse segment S0 and (1b) 
corresponds to discourse segment S1. In this case, we can say, following (3a), that a 
change of state could be inferred from (1a) due to the telic predicate turned  around, 
whose final state, that is, Josef having change his physical location, can, in some sense, 
be ‘inferred’ from the man pulling his gun from his holster. It’s natural to understand 
the man’s pulling his gun from his holster to be contingent  on (and hence inferable 
from) Josef having turned around.5 In contrast, it is unlikely that (2b) is linked to (2a) 
via OCCASION because, given world knowledge reasoning, it’s hard to see how a man 
having a gun in his holster could be contingent on Josef’s turning around. Instead, (2b) 
is linked to (2a) by BACKGROUND (Lascarides and Asher 1993), whose temporal import 
is ‘overlap’ between two described eventualities.6 
In sum, coherence‐based theories like Hobbs’ derive the temporal ordering of 
events in narrative discourse by appealing to particular kinds of world knowledge 
reasoning, such as the kind encoded by OCCASION and BACKGROUND. This, according 
to Kehler (2002), allows for a much simpler analysis of the past tense: it constitutes a 
precedence relation between the speech time and the event time (Kehler 2002:191); 
there is no need for an intermediary notion of a reference  time because narrative 
                                                 
3 See, e.g. Kehler 2002, Wolf and Gibson 2005, Altshuler 2012, Rhode and Horton 2014 and references 
therein. 
4 A satisfactory analysis of narrative discourse  is much more complex, however, involving a multitude of 
rhetorical relations (in addition to OCCASION). We consider some of these relations in the next section.  
5 Note that the clause in (3a) is sufficient to establish OCCASION between (1a) and (1b). See Hobbs 1990, for 
examples which motivate the clause in (3b) and narrative sequences which blur the distinction between 
(3a) and (3b), i.e. where OCCASION can be established by either clause. 
6 Lascarides and Asher 1993 define BACKGROUND(S0, S1) as: The state described by S0 is the ‘backdrop’ or 
circumstance under which an event described by S1 occurred. 
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progression (or lack thereof) is an epiphenomenon of speakers seeking coherence in a 
given discourse.7 
A similar conclusion was also reached by Lascarides and Asher (1993:43738) 
who were the first to point out, based on the discourses below, that grammatically‐
based theories of narrative progression do not explain the backward movement of time 
in (4). Moreover, “they are unable to explain why the natural interpretations of [(5a) 
and (5b)] are different” (Lascarides and Asher 1993:43738). That is, it is surprising on 
Partee’s analysis outlined above that two eventive sentences in (4) don’t invoke 
narrative progression. Similarly, it is surprising that the stative sentence The room was 
pitch dark in (5a) triggers narrative progression, but the same sentence in (5b) does not. 
 
(4) Max fell. John pushed him.  
 
(5)  a. Max opened the door. The room was pitch dark. 
       b. Max switched off the light. The room was pitch dark. 
 
An appeal to commonsense reasoning could, however, explain the data above 
according to Asher and Lascarides. For example, the second sentence in (4) is naturally 
understood to be an explanation of the first sentence (invoking the so‐called 
EXPLANATION relation8), while (5a) and (5b) diﬀer in that the first sentence of (5a) 
naturally invokes BACKGROUND, while the first sentence of (5b) invokes RESULT9, a 
relation that could be thought of in terms of Humean cause‐effect.10 
More recently, Bittner (2008, 2014) has attempted to defend the grammatical view 
of narrative progression. Based on a wide array of genetically unrelated language with 
rich morphological marking, she argued that aspectual distinctions are, in fact, 
responsible for the understood temporal location of an eventuality. Moreover, she 
suggests that English verbs, which exemplify impoverished morphology, are 
underspecified for aspectual type, thereby making it extremely difficult to come up 
with meaningful generalizations about narratives in English. While Bittner does not 
                                                 
7 Kehler (2002) does, ultimately, conclude that the perfect requires the notion of a reference time. This, 
according to Kehler, is what makes the perfect different from all other tenses. 
8 Lascarides and Asher 1993 define EXPLANATION(S0, S1) as: The event described by S1 explains why the 
event described by S0 happened (perhaps by causing it). 
9 Lascarides and Asher 1993 define RESULT(S0, S1) as: The event described by S0 caused the event or state 
described by S1. 
10 (5) could also be argued to exemplify Hobbsian OCCASION. However, Lascarides and Asher (1993) don’t 
consider this relation to be primitive. More recently, Asher and Lascarides (2003) treated OCCASION as a 
trigger for NARRATION, which is discussed in the next section. 
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characterize the alleged underspecification in examples like (4)(5)11, her position is 
supported by Caenepeel’s and Moens’ (1994:10) observation that if we assume that 
EXPLANATION (or commonsense reasoning more generally) triggers backward 
movement of time for simple past sequences, then it is unclear why (6a) and (7a) are 
infelicitous, or at least worse than their b‐counterparts: 
 
(6)  a. ?Everyone laughed. Fred told a joke.   
       b. Fred told a joke. Everyone laughed. 
 
(7)  a. ?The committee applauded. Niegel announced his promotion. 
       b. Niegel announced his promotion. The committee applauded. 
 
Clearly, a salient causal link between someone telling a joke and people laughing 
and between someone’s promotion being announced and people applauding is 
evident. Nevertheless, that does not make (6a) and (7a) felicitous. 
The data above suggests that perhaps Bittner is right and that generalizations 
about narrative progression should not be based solely on English data.12 To that end, 
we choose to consider narrative discourses from Russian and French, languages with 
explicit aspectual marking. Adopting the coherence‐based approach to discourse 
interpretation advocated by Asher, Hobbs, Kehler, Lascarides and others, the aim of 
this squib is to provide new evidence in favor of a Partee‐type meaning of the past 
tense, namely one that encodes a reference time. This aim is achieved as follows. In the 
next section, we argue that on the one hand, OCCASION is a necessary ingredient to 
model narrative discourse, but on the other hand, we also need a relation which is 
defined in purely temporal terms; something like Asher and Lascarides’ (2003) 
NARRATION. Subsequently, in section 3, we show that the choice between these two 
relations is governed by various factors, such as the use of aspect and the presence (or 
lack thereof) of temporal locating adverbials. In section 4, we suggest that this 
observation warrants a semantic explanation that involves the notion of a reference time, 
and sketch out some ideas for what the explanation could be like, while remaining 
neutral about the particular formal implementation.  
In sum, the methodology assumed in this squib is as follows. We look at 
narrative discourses of various kinds and consider which rhetorical relations 
adequately model the inferences that are invoked. Subsequently, we ask what in the 
grammar is responsible for triggering the rhetorical relations that we observe. After 
                                                 
11 See Kamp, Genabith and Reyle 2011 for a proposal. 
12 See Toosarvandani 2014 for more discussion of this point. 
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reaching a natural hypothesis, we conclude that only a particular kind of semantic 
analysis, namely one that involves the notion of a reference  time, could explain why 
these grammatical forms should trigger the rhetorical relations that we observe. So, in 
essence, the methodology employed here starts from the discourse level and concludes 
with questions about form and meaning. We believe that this methodology is essential 
for explaining intuitions about the temporal location of eventualities. Moreover, by 
looking at Russian and French, we hope to advance Bittner’s motto: in order  to better 
understand narrative discourse, study  languages with rich morphology that encodes aspectual 
distinctions. 
 
 
2. OCCASION, NARRATION or Both? 
 
In the previous section, we saw how OCCASION plays a vital role in accounting for the 
contrasting inferences in (1)(2). However, we also noted that narrative discourse is 
more complex than what is suggested by (1)(2). One complication is that there appear 
to be discourses that exemplify narrative progression, yet the described events are not 
understood as being related via a contingency relationship involving changes of states. 
For example, consider the discourses below, in (8)(10): 
 
(8) A man murdered Mitys. Shortly after, a statue of Mitys fell on the murderer, killing 
him instantly (Aristotleʹs Poetics, cited in Cumming 2010).  
 
(9) “That will be 72 cents”, the grocer said. “AAAAAAAAAAAA!” Jack screamed, 
looking down to see a busy bee stinging him on the little finger (after Richard 
Brautigan, Revenge of the Lawn, Sam Cumming, pers. comm.).  
 
(10) A wave crashed down on Bob, ruining his new suit. “Iʹll sue you for that,” said 
Bob. Another wave crashed down on him shortly thereafter, carrying off his 
bowler hat (Sam Cumming, pers. comm.).  
 
In (8), a man is described as killing another man and then being killed by a statue. 
Since statues are not the sorts of things that react to murders, the second killing cannot 
be contingent on the first. In (9), we understand that two speech acts—the grocer 
asking Jack to pay and Jack screaming—happened in temporal succession, but there is 
no understood contingency between them, e.g. we don’t infer that Jack was screaming 
at the grocer. Finally, in (10), we infer that a wave crashed after Bob playfully 
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threatened the wave. Since waves are not the kind of things that react to threats, once 
again, there is no understood contingency between the two events. 
If we conclude that there is no understood contingency between the events 
described in (8)(10), then it seems far‐fetched to account for the narrative progression 
in these discourses by appealing to OCCASION. But if not OCCASION, then what?13 One 
possibility is to adopt Asher and Lascarides’ (2003) NARRATION: 
 
(11) NARRATION(S1, S2): the event described by S1 follows an event described by S2 
 
In addition, following Cumming (2013), we will assume that a discourse is coherent if 
it addresses some question  under  discussion  (QUD).14 For example, the QUD in (8) is 
something like Who killed who? In (9), the QUD is something like What happened  in the 
store? And in (10), the QUD is something like What happened between Bob and the wave? 
What all these QUDs have in common is that they are compatible with the temporal 
order imposed by NARRATION. In contrast, there is no reasonable QUD in (12) below 
that would also satisfy the temporal order imposed by NARRATION.  
 
(12) At five o’clock, my car started and the rain stopped.  
(Moens and Steedman 1988:22) 
 
A reasonable QUD such as What happened at five? would trigger PARALLEL (or perhaps 
CONTRAST)15, but crucially not NARRATION. As a result, there is no understood narrative 
progression.  
                                                 
13 According to Jerry Hobbs (pers. comm.), (8) could be analyzed as a kind of parallel since both sentences 
describe a similar event, namely killing, and the agent and the patient of the two events is the same 
individual. Perhaps (10) could also be analyzed along these lines. (9), however, does not seem to involve 
any parallel. 
14 This assumption is a departure from Asher and Lascarides’ (2003) proposal that discourses exemplifying 
NARRATION must also satisfy the so‐called common topic constraint. 
15 While there is no consensus as to how PARALLEL and CONTRAST should be defined, most theories of 
discourse coherence agree that these relations are fundamental. Below, I provide Hobbs’s (1990) 
definitions. See, e.g. Kehler 2002 and Asher and Lascarides 2003 for diﬀerent renditions. 
(i) PARALLEL(S0, S1):  
Infer p(a1, a2…) from the assertion of S0, and p(b1, b2…) from the assertion of S1, where ai and bi are 
similar for all i (Hobbs 1990:93). 
(ii) CONTRAST(S0, S1):  
a. Infer p(a) from the assertion of S0, and ¬p(b) from the assertion of S1, where a and b are similar.  
b. Infer p(a) from the assertion of S0, and ¬p(b) from the assertion of S1, where there is some property q 
such that q(a) and ¬q(b) (Hobbs 1990:99). 
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Similarly, there is no possible QUD in (13) below that would satisfy the temporal 
order imposed by NARRATION. Unlike (12), however, (13) is incoherent because it 
arguably does not satisfy any rhetorical relation. 
 
(13) #Christ was born no later than 4 B.C. and today Fortuna won the match. 
 
In sum, there are narrative discourses that do not exemplify OCCASION. 
NARRATION seems to be helpful in analyzing these discourses. A question that arises, 
however, is how exactly QUD is linked to NARRATION and other rhetorical relations. 
Could it be the case that a sufficient answer to this question would eliminate the need 
for OCCASION altogether? While no concrete answer to this question has been provided 
to the best of our knowledge, and none will be provided here, the next section will look 
at data that is directly relevant. We will first look at discourses suggesting that the 
Russian imperfective is incompatible with OCCASION. Then, we will see narratives with 
the Russian imperfective where NARRATION is exemplified. We will take these data as 
evidence that both relations are linguistically relevant and this will set the stage for us 
showing that semantic factors contribute to NARRATION, rather than OCCASION, being 
exemplified by a given discourse. 
 
 
3. Aspect in Past‐Tensed Discourses 
 
In this section we would like to show that both OCCASION and NARRATION are 
linguistically relevant. To do so, we would like to first consider discourses that describe 
two events that could, in principle, be related to one another in multiple ways. We 
show that using a particular aspect in Russian (i.e. perfective vs. imperfective) 
constrains the possible ways in which the event ordering could actually be understood.  
Let’s begin by considering a discourse that describes the following two events: 
An event of entering the castle and an event of reading a brochure about this castle. In 
principle, we could imagine the following ways in which these events could be related 
to form a coherent discourse: (a) reading a brochure about a castle sets up the occasion 
for visiting it, (b) the castle was entered with the knowledge gained from having read 
the brochure, (c) the castle was entered while reading the brochure, and (d) the 
entering of the castle set up the occasion to read a brochure about it.  
 
(14) Dudkin za‐še‐l                v     zamok. On čita‐l                  brošjuru  ob     ètom zamke. 
        Dudkin pfv‐go‐pst.3sg into castle    he  read.ipf‐pst.3sg brochure about this  castle  
       ‘Dudkin entered the castle. He {had read/was reading} a brochure about this 
castle.’ 
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Interestingly, the use of the imperfective (‘IPF’) čital (‘read’) in (14) is compatible 
with the situations described in (a)(c), but not in (d). To describe (d), the perfective 
(ʹPFVʹ) počital is preferred. 
Let us now turn to the discourse in (15), cited by Altshuler (2012: 86): 
(15) Gruzinskaja    storona   ešče    s         utra           zajavila,                                  čto  
        Georgian         side        even   from  morning   announce.PFV‐PST.3SG‐FEM   that  
        peredača    uže            sostoja‐l‐a‐s’, 
        exchange    already     take.place.PFV‐PST.3SG‐FEM‐RFL 
       ‘The Georgians said in the morning that the exchange had already taken place,’ 
        rossijskaja   storona   èto    oprovergla‐l‐a.  
        Russian        side        this   deny.IPF‐PST.3SG‐FEM  
       ‘the Russians had denied this…’  
        (Izvestĳa, 2002.10.04) 
Here, we understand that the Russians denied that an exchange had taken place. The 
question relevant for the purposes here is: When is this denial understood to have 
taken place relative to the announcement made by the Georgians? World knowledge 
tells us that denying must take place after the claim that is being denied. However, 
with the imperfective verb oproverglala (‘deny’), the denial is actually understood to be 
the general position that had been held by the Russians regardless of what the 
Georgians claimed. Put differently, the imperfective verb describes a habitual state that 
is not contingent on the Georgian claim. To describe a denial that is contingent on the 
Georgian claim, the perfective counterpart, oprovergla, would have to be used. 
In sum, (14) is a case in which the described events could, in principle, be ordered 
in every possible way, and (15) is a case in which world knowledge reasoning biases 
narrative progression. However, in both discourses, narrative progression is not 
inferred when the imperfective is used.  
Let us now consider a pair of discourses that force narrative progression. We 
start with (16), where the use of imperfective would lead to an infelicitous discourse: 
(16) Musčina  vo‐še‐l            v   <<White Hart>>. On   byl               v   černom   pidžake  
        man        PFV‐go‐PST     to      White Hart       he    be.IPF‐PST    in   black      jacket 
      ‘A man entered the White Hart. He wore a black jacket.’ 
      Bill {OKda‐l/                #dava‐l}           emu    bakal   pivo.  
      Bill      give.PFV‐PST     give.IPF‐PST    him     mug    beer  
      ‘Bill gave him a mug of beer.’  
       (after Kamp and Reyle 1993) 
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This discourse describes a man who entered a bar while wearing a black jacket. 
Subsequently, the discourse describes this man receiving a mug of beer. Given that 
people receive beer after they enter a bar (rather than before), narrative progression is 
forced (or heavily biased). Consequently, the imperfective daval (‘gave’) is not possible; 
the perfective dal must be used instead.  
An analogous point could be made with respect to the discourse in (17) below: 
(17) Dva  goda  spustja,    v  1977  gody, amerikanskij geometr          Robert Konnelli 
        two years   removed in 1977  year   American       geometrician  Robert Connelli 
        po‐stroi‐l                   pervye    primery       izgibaemyx,   mnogogrannikov 
        PFV‐build‐PST.3SG     first        examples      flexible           polyhedron 
        i      tem samym {OKoproverg/                  #oproverga‐l}              gipotezu     Ejlera. 
        and that same      disprove.PFV.PST.3SG    disprove.IPF.PST.3SG  hypothesis  Euler   
       ‘Two years ago, in 1977, the American geometrician Robert Connelli built the first 
flexible polyhedron, and thereby disproved Euler’s hypothesis.’  
(N.P. Dolbilin, Žemčužiny teorii mnogogrannikov) 
The phrase i tem samym (‘and thereby’) forces a contingency relationship between the 
polyhedron having been built by Connelli and the disproval of Euler’s hypothesis. 
Consequently, the imperfective verb oproverglal  (‘disproved’) cannot be used to assert 
the disproval of Euler’s hypothesis; its perfective counterpart must be used instead. 
Based on the discourses above, Altshuler (2012) proposes that the Russian 
imperfective is incompatible with OCCASION. While we agree with this hypothesis, it is 
important to see why a more general hypothesis fails, namely that the Russian 
imperfective is incompatible with NARRATION and is only therefore incompatible with 
OCCASION. Consider (18): 
(18)  a. Osen’ju 1888  godu  Ul’janovu  bylo       razrešeno   vernut’sja   v    Kazanʹ.  
 fall         1888  year    Ul’janov    was.IPF  allowed       return        to   Kazan  
 Zdesʹ on   vposledstvii   vstupil         v   odin  iz       marksistskix  kružkov...  
   here   he  subsequently  joined.PFV  in  one    from  Marxist           circles 
‘In the fall of 1888, Ul’yanov was allowed to return to Kazan. Here he 
subsequently joined one of the Marxist circles...’ 
 b. V  1924   godu   N.K.  Krupskaja   pisala        v   “Pravde”:  
 in  1924   year    N.K.  Krupskaja   wrote.IPF   in   “Pravda”  
 “Plexanova, Vladimir   Il’ič    ljubil          strastno...” 
   Plexanov    Vladimir   Ilich   loved.IPF   passionatly  
 ‘In 1924, N.K. Krupskaja wrote in “Pravda”: “Vladimir Ilich loved Plexanov 
passionately.’ 
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The discourse above is a snippet from a long narrative about Lenin’s life. (18a) 
describes two subsequent events starting in 1888: Lenin’s permission to return to 
Kazan and his subsequent joining one of the Marxist circles. The narrative then goes on 
to describe several other events in Lenin’s life, leading to the end of a paragraph. The 
new paragraph opens with (18b) above, which describes an event that took place 36 
years later, in 1924, when Lenin’s wife, Krupskaja, wrote about Lenin in the newspaper 
Pravda. What’s crucial for our purposes is the fact that the imperfective past tense verb 
pisala (‘wrote’) is used in a context where there is clear narrative progression. Given the 
temporal locating adverbial that begins (18b), Krupskaja’s writing about Lenin must be 
understood as occurring after the events described in (18a). 
Several comments are in order. To begin with, note that the writing event 
described in (18b) is not understood to be contingent on the events described in (18a). 
Therefore, saying that OCCASION relates Krupskaja’s writing to a previously mentioned 
event would be misleading. Rather, something like NARRATION is exemplified because 
the imperfective clause, along with the adverbial that modifies it, is simply used to 
assert that an event (i.e. writing) took place in 1924, after the other events. The QUD is 
something like What happened in Lenin’s life?16 
As noted in the previous section, much more needs to be said about how QUD is 
linked to the choice of a retorical relation, and NARRATION in particular.17 For our 
purposes, what is crucial to take away is three‐fold: (a) past imperfectives are used in 
narrative discourse18, but (b) only when the narrative involves something like 
NARRATION rather than OCCASION and (c) it also involves a temporal locating 
adverbial. Based on (a) and (b), we conclude that the Russian imperfective is allergic to 
OCCASION, but welcomes NARRATION. This conclusion is supported by the fact that (17) 
and (18) are infelicitous with the imperfective precisely because contingency (which is 
the hallmark trigger of OCCASION) is forced.  
We now turn to the observation in (c) and its relation to (a) and (b). In the next 
section, we argue that the notion of a reference time allows for a natural explanation for 
why the imperfective is allergic to OCCASION but not NARRATION. 
                                                 
16 Based on this QUD, it’s tempting to argue that a parallel is being established. This, however, seems 
unlikely given the definition of PARALLEL in fn. 15. In particular, note that the agent of the writing event 
described in (18b) is not Lenin but his wife.  
17 With respect to (18), one relevant observation is that the writing event described in (18b) is not at‐issue; 
the writing by Krupskaja serves as evidence for what Lenin’s feelings towards Plexanov are like and these 
feelings are at issue. See Simons 2007 for an analysis of propositional attitude verbs as evidentials. 
18 This observation was noted by Chvany (1985), though her discussion centers around the imperfective 
present, which is the form used in Russian for the historical present. This squib has nothing to say about 
this usage of the imperfective. 
144  D. Altshuler and S. Melkonian 
 
4. In Defense of the Reference Time 
 
In what follows, we would like to advance the hypothesis that temporal locating 
adverbials license the use of the Russian imperfective in particular narrative 
progression contexts, that is, those discourses that exemplify NARRATION. This idea is, 
in part, motivated by the observation that it would be odd to utter (18b) above as a 
continuation of (18a) without the temporal locating adverbial V 1924 godu ‘In 1924’. In 
addition, there is evidence for the hypothesis from French. It has often been observed 
that the imparfait is odd in narrative contexts (see, e.g., Kamp and Rohrer 1983). For 
example, the imparfait pénétrait ‘entered’ in (19) below is infelicitous due to the 
narrative progression. 
 
(19) #Maigret reprit la petite auto noire et il pénétrait dans la brasserie de la place de la 
République. 
‘Maigret once more took the little black car and he entered the café at the 
Republic square.’ 
 
Interestingly, inserting a temporal locating adverbial, quelques minutes plus tard ‘a 
few minutes later’, in the imparfait clause of (19) renders the discourse perfectly 
natural: 
 
(20) Maigret reprit la petite auto noire et, quelques minutes plus tard, il pénétrait dans 
la brasserie de la place de la République. 
‘Maigret once more took the little black car and a few minutes later he entered the 
café at the Republic square’ (Grønn 2008). 
 
The use of the imparfait in (20) has been called “the imparfait narrative” (or 
“imparfait de rupture”) and it has often been noted that it requires a temporal locating 
adverbial (often in fronted position). For example, Tasmowski (1985:6) claims: “the 
development of the IR (= “imparfait de rupture”) crucially depends on a temporal 
adverb at the beginning of the sentence, this adverb being in charge of introducing a 
new temporal moment in the text”. Tasmowski cites Klum (1961), who compared how 
many times in a corpus the temporal locating adverbials appeared with the imparfait 
narrative. Klum suggested that in presence of temporal locating adverbials, the 
imparfait is often preferred to the passé simple. Kamp and Rohrer (1983:258) provide 
the beginnings of an explanation for this observation when they write: “[…] Indeed 
when an imparfait sentence is to refer to a time other than the reference point it must 
contain a temporal adverbial (which may take the form of a single adverbial, a 
prepositional phrase or a subordinate clause) to indicate that time.” One way to 
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interpret this idea is that the imparfait naturally occurs without the presence of 
temporal adverbials, for example, when it’s embedded in a discourse and gets its 
reference time from surrounding context. In the presence of temporal adverbials, 
however, it is that adverbial that provides the temporal anchor, that is, the reference 
time required by the imparfait.  
This invites a compositional semantic analysis of the interaction between tense, 
aspect and temporal adverbials. Crucially, such an analysis must explain how this 
interaction constrains the structure of a discourse, that is, whether OCCASION or 
NARRATION is inferred. In what follows, we would like to offer a suggestion for what 
this analysis could be like, while remaining neutral about the formal implementation. 
Crucial in this suggestion will be the notion of a reference  time. In this way, we will 
come full circle. Recall that we started with Partee’s analysis, which appealed to 
reference times to explain narrative progression. Subsequently, we saw that coherence‐
based analyses can explain the same data without positing reference times. And now, 
the suggestion will be that past oriented narratives involving the imperfective aspect 
show that we need reference times to explain the interaction between tense, aspect and 
temporal adverbials and, in particular, how this interaction impacts the discourse 
structure. So, in essence, Partee’s analysis was on the right track, but for reasons that 
were not considered until now. 
Here is the crux of our suggestion about how to model temporal meanings. 
Aspectual meaning is responsible for constraining the temporal location of a described 
eventuality relative to a time argument that is saturated by the tense. If there are no 
temporal locating adverbials, the saturated time is left as a free variable; it functions 
like the aforementioned reference time used to define the past tense by Partee (1984; see 
discussion in §1). It could lead us to infer OCCASION if the particular relation between 
the reference time and eventuality time encoded by the aspect is compatible with 
OCCASION. With respect to the Russian imperfective, what we would like to say, then, 
is that its semantics imposes a relation between the reference time and eventuality time 
that is in direct conflict with OCCASION (as defined in §1).19 
                                                 
19 Altshuler (2012) shows how this can be formally implemented. He proposes that the Russian 
imperfective denotes a function from a set of events denoted by the VP that it combines with to a set of 
VP‐event parts. The consequent states of these event parts are related to a temporal coordinate that is 
specified by the discourse context; it functions similar to Partee’s reference time discussed at the outset with 
one key difference: the reference time corresponds to the run time of salient consequent state previously 
introduced into the discourse context (cf. Webber 1988; Bittner 2008, 2014). Now, recall from §1 that 
OCCASION is defined in terms of salient (final and initial) states. Altshuler’s idea is that the semantics of the 
Russian imperfective rules out OCCASION because the particular relation that it imposes (between the 
consequent state that it describes and the salient consequent state introduced into the discourse context) is 
in direct conflict with the state ordering in the definition of OCCASION. 
146  D. Altshuler and S. Melkonian 
 
Now, if there is a temporal locating adverbial present, then the time left free by 
the tense—which can then function as a reference time—is existentially bound by the 
adverbial. In other words, temporal locating adverbials are devices of anaphoric 
closure because they prevent the otherwise free time variable from getting its value 
from the context.  
One question that comes up for this toy analysis is why the presence of temporal 
adverbials often leads us to infer NARRATION rather than OCCASION in narrative 
discourse. One possible hypothesis, pursued in recent work (Altshuler and Melkonian 
2014) is that temporal adverbials introduce a reference time which establishes a 
temporal gap between two events e and e’ that is inconsistent with e being contingent 
on e’ (see Dowty 1986 for a related idea). Therefore, OCCASION is often not exemplified 
in narrative segments that contain temporal adverbials.  
This idea is nicely illustrated by the aforementioned discourse in (18). Recall that 
the temporal adverbial in (18b) is used to open the beginning of a paragraph. We 
believe that the temporal adverbial is especially well suited here because it allows 
Krupskaja’s writing in “Pravda” to stand after a large enough temporal gap such that 
we could further infer that there were intermediary events not mentioned in the 
discourse that Krupskaja’s writing in “Pravda” was contingent upon. As noted above, 
we suggest to model this idea as anaphoric closure by the adverbial. Without this 
anaphoric closure, the hearer would attempt to establish a contingency relationship 
directly, by picking out reference times established in the local context. However, such 
a relationship is not warranted given the facts described in the discourse, which is why 
(18b) is odd without an adverbial. 
We end this section by noting that there are temporal adverbials which are not 
devices of anaphoric closure. That is, they do not provide a reference time because they 
are “discourse transparent”. As illustrated by Altshuler (2014), that  same  day is an 
adverbial of this kind. Altshuler observed that adding this adverbial to a narrative 
discourse does not alter the narrative progression—the adverbial is, as it were, 
‘transparent to the progress’. Consider, for example, the discourse in (21) below: 
 
(21)  a. On May 12, 1984, Sue gave Fido a bath and cleaned our house. 
        b. That  same  day,  my wife hired her and gave her a check for one month in 
advance. 
 
Specifying that the hiring took place on the same day as the house cleaning does 
not block the additional inference that the hiring took place after the house cleaning. 
Crucially, (21) makes no claim about the exact temporal distance there is between the 
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house cleaning and the hiring. The only claim made is that the temporal distance 
is relatively short (see fn. 1).  
The discourse transparency that we see in (21) can be replicated with related 
temporal adverbials and in non‐narrative discourse contexts. Consider (22b) below, 
which differs from (21b) in containing the pluperfect (rather than the simple past). As a 
result, we understand that the hiring took place prior to the house cleaning. Crucially, 
this inference is present regardless of whether that same month and that very month are 
used. That is, these adverbials are transparent to the narrative regression. 
 
(22)  a. Some months ago, Sue gave Fido a bath and cleaned our house. 
         b. (That same month/That very month) my wife had hired her and had given her 
a check for one month in advance. 
 
In (23) below, there is no order that the events in (23b,c) are understood to have 
occurred in (though they are understood to precede the event described in (23a)). Such 
is the case whether or not that same week or that very week are present in (23c). That is, 
specifying that the events described in (23b,c) all took place during the same week does 
not provide any new information that is not already inferred without that same week or 
that very week. 
 
(23)  a. Bill will move next week. 
 b. Last week, his house burned down. 
         c. (That same week/That very week) he divorced Sue and he was fired. 
 
In sum, what distinguishes an adverbial like that same day from an adverbial like 
in  1924  is that the time described by the former always preserves the temporal 
structure of a discourse, that is, it is transparent  to the independent rules that account 
for the temporal structure of a given discourse. Following Altshuler 2014, this can be 
modeled on the toy analysis by saying that a distinguishing property between 
temporal adverbials is whether or not they introduce a reference time. Temporal 
adverbials like in  1924 clearly do, and this impacts the structure of a discourse, 
mediated by tense and aspect. Adverbials like that same day, however, do not introduce 
a reference time, thereby preserving the discourse structure that has been constrained 
by the tense and aspect.  
A prediction of this analysis is that in contingency contexts that trigger 
OCCASION, the presence of an adverb like that same day should not license the use of the 
imperfective (unlike the presence of an adverb like in 1924). This prediction is borne 
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out in the Lenin discourse in (18). If we were to replace v 1924 godu in (18b) with v tot že 
samyj den’ (‘that same day’), the discourse would be odd; the perfective form of pisala 
‘write’, namely napisala, would be preferred. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
We hope that the toy analysis developed in the previous section provides a glimpse of 
what a formal implementation of the data considered in this squib could be like. The 
contribution should be thought of as providing some constraints on whatever formal 
implementation is chosen. We acknowledge that we have not showed how, exactly, 
grammatical components such as tense, aspect and temporal adverbials interact with 
pragmatic principles such as OCCASION or NARRATION. Rather, we have provided an 
argument, involving empirical evidence, that there must be such an interaction and 
argued that the notion of reference time is necessary to make sense of it. 
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